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A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual
Privacy after Lawrence v. Texas
Marybeth Herald†

INTRODUCTION
“What a massive disruption of the current social order, therefore, the
overruling of Bowersentails.” 1
If Justice Scalia’s dire prediction in Lawrence v. Texas comes true, Texas,
Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Kansas, and Colorado may no
longer be able to forbid the sale of vibrators, dildos, and other “sex toys” within
their borders. These states have enacted legislation to inhibit activity in the sex
toys market.2 Under the now discredited Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld
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Joel Bergsma, Julie Greenberg, Kenneth Vandevelde, and Ellen Waldman for their helpful comments
and consistent encouragement and support, Dorothy Hampton for her tireless retrieval of research
materials, and Marjorie Antoine for her valuable research assistance.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted in
his Lawrence dissent that:
Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition
that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is “immoral and unacceptable”
constitutes a rational basis for regulation. See, e.g., Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing Bowers [v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)], in upholding
Alabama’s prohibition on the sale of sex toys on the ground that “[t]he crafting and
safeguarding of public morality. . . indisputably is a legitimate government interest under
rational basis scrutiny.”).
2. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21, 43.23 (Vernon 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (2003);
- 105 (2000); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975 & Supp. 2003); LA.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7101, 102 (2003).
The Supreme Courts of Kansas and Colorado struck down their obscene device statutes as
overbroad and a violation of privacy rights. See State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1990)
(“We hold the dissemination and promotion of such devices for purposes of medical and psychological
therapy to be constitutionally protected activity.. . . The State has demonstrated no interest in the broad
prohibition of distributing the devices in question sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of
the rights of those seeking to use them in legitimate ways.”); People v. Seven Thirty Five Colfax, Inc.,
697 P.2d 348, 368 (Colo. 1985) (“[T]he statutory scheme impermissibly burdens the right of privacy.”).
Alabama’s statute is currently under constitutional attack. See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d
944 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no fundamental right at stake, but remanding the case to district court for
further consideration of Alabama’s ban on the sale of vibrators and dildos). On remand, the district
Copyright © 2004 by the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
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criminalizing same-sex sodomy, the government was free to label the sale of
sex toys as a “crime” by prosecuting it under the banner of morality.3 As
Justice Scalia laments, however, Lawrence’s overruling of Bowers may change
all that by restricting the scope of permissible government intrusion in the
bedroom.
Indeed Texas, the home of the sodomy law struck down in Lawrence, is
currently writing yet another morality play that pits sexual privacy against the
forces of the government. Joanne Webb, representative for a company called
“Passion Parties” and mother of three, has been cast reluctantly in the leading
role.4 A “passion party” is a Tupperware party-like gathering that replaces the
clean and airtight food storage containers with vibrators and exotic lotions.5
The cozy gatherings that propelled Earl Tupper’s rather mundane invention into
the domestic hall of fame in the 1950s combined product demonstrations with
intimacy and camaraderie.6 In a similar manner, “Passion Parties” allow a
woman like Joanne Webb to display sex-enhancement products for sale and
explain how they work in a comfortable, private home setting.7
It is here, however, that the comparison between plastic and passion ends.
Although selling plastic containers is legal and perhaps profitable, selling
passion in Texas can get you a year in jail and a $4000 fine.8 In the Texas case,
undercover police officers, posing as a married couple in need of some

court again struck down the law as a violation of the right to privacy. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp.2d
1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002). The appeal of that decision is pending.
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the state’s obscenity statute, stating that it did not
violate the Louisiana constitution’s right to privacy because that right does not extend to purchasing or
promoting obscene devices. Nevertheless, the court struck the statute down as not rationally related to a
legitimate interest because it did not contain a medical exception for the use of vibrators where
therapeutically appropriate. See State v. Brenan, 772 So.2d 64 (La. 2000).
Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi statutes prohibiting the sale of obscene devices have
withstood Constitutional attacks on various grounds. See Sewell v. Georgia, 233 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1977),
appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (holding statute providing any device designed or marketed as
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs is obscene material not unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad); Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
constitutionally protected right to privacy does not include use of or possession with intent to promote
obscene devices); Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (upholding statute
criminalizing promotion of and possession with intent to promote obscene devices upheld as legitimate
exercise of state police power, justified under rationale of protecting the societal interest in order and
morality); PHE Inc. v. State, 2004 WL 527836, ___ So.2d ___ (March 18, 2004) (upholding Mississippi
obscenity statute because the commercial sale of sexual devices not protected by Mississippi
constitution’s right of privacy).
3. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. See Mireya Navarro, Women Tailor Sex Industry to Their Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at
A1; Laurie Fox, Was Hers a Crime of Passion? DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20, 2003, at 1B.
5. See Leonard Pitts, Deep in the Heart of Texas They’re Nuts, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2004, at 19.
6. It was a woman, Bonnie Wise, who came up with this marketing idea. She ultimately became a
multi-millionaire by understanding her market and selling clean, casual, and efficient suburban living to
the caste of women in charge of the kitchen, ironically providing home business opportunities to many
of them in the process. See ALISON J. CLARKE, TUPPERWARE: THE PROMISE OF PLASTIC IN 1950S
AMERICA (2001).
7. See generally Pitts, supra note 5.
8. Id.
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bedroom spice, purchased a vibrator, and Webb helpfully explained how to use
it. For explaining a vibrator’s role in sex, Webb was charged with obscenity.9
Texas, of course, is not the first state to be unduly concerned with its
constituents’ sexual expressions. Over the years, many states have devoted
their limited prosecutorial resources to policing bedrooms for violations of laws
forbidding fornication, adultery, and sex aids.10 Although many state
legislatures have repealed such laws, some outlying states maintain fidelity to
this type of sexual morality regulation. The recent decision in Lawrence poses
the question of whether the Constitution allows the government to bring its
handcuffs into the consenting adult’s bedroom.
Consider, for example, Alabama’s anti-vibrator law. Alabama claims an
interest in banning “the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism, for
its own sake, unrelated to marriage, procreation, or familial relationships,”11
and in discouraging “prurient interests in autonomous sex.”12 Alabama asserts,
“the pursuit of orgasms by artificial means for their own sake is detrimental to
the health and morality of the State.”13 In Williams v. Pryor, decided before
Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit vigilantly guarded the legislature’s right to
protect morality against the onslaught of autonomous sex behind the closed
doors of the bedroom. The Court rejected a facial challenge and upheld the
statute, effectively finding that one’s right to sexual privacy protects only those
acts performed with another consenting adult’s body.14 Sexual privacy rights
do not protect an individual’s sexual expression using toys or devices, even if
the individual prefers such devices to a physical partner in the interests of
avoiding pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, or achieving an
orgasm.15
The Supreme Court has discussed procreation, privacy, and sex in a
number of court decisions.16 These decisions leave a trail of mysterious clues
that lead in conflicting and circuitous directions. Lawrence v. Texas, which
9. Id.
10. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX
LAWS 98-110 (1996).
11. Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1284-93 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
12. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001).
13. Id. (quoting Alabama’s appellate brief). In a Louisiana case concerning a similar statute, the
legislative history indicated that the law was passed as a “simple way of helping in the war on
obscenity.” State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 73 (La. 2000).
14. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d. at 949-50 (Given Alabama’s legitimate legislative interest in
“discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex, . . . Alabama did not act irrationally by prohibiting
only the commercial distribution of sexual devices, rather than prohibiting their possession or use or by
directly proscribing masturbation with or without a sexual device.”).
15. On remand, the District Court of Alabama found that the adult plaintiffs had a fundamental
right to sexual privacy and the state had no compelling interest in banning the sale of sex aids to them.
Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp.2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002). Of course, pre-Lawrence precedent was
typically skeptical of such a fundamental right. See discussion, notes 33-47, infra.
16. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
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gave constitutional protection to same-sex adult sodomy, is the latest signpost
on this trail and a good example of the Court’s problematic jurisprudence.17
The Supreme Court’s opinion avoids formulating a specific rule to guide
discretion, opting instead to emphasize “distinguishing factors” – hints that
suggest the roads not taken in the decision.18 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s
dissent, with its ominous prophecy that Lawrence will be the death of
legislation banning sex aids and other “morality crimes,” provides a tantalizing
promise of a potentially broad application.19
Part I of this Article details and critiques generally the Supreme Court’s
past precedent limiting constitutional privacy and liberty rights. Although the
Court’s past analysis purported to honor history and tradition, in fact, the
“history and tradition” test undermines the notion of constitutional privacy
rights in both design and practice. Moreover, by using history and tradition in
interpreting the limits of substantive due process, the Court allowed gender
discrimination to infect constitutional interpretation.
The result is a
contaminated analysis.
Part II discusses the history of sex aids–specifically devices intended to
allow women to achieve orgasm–in the context of their history and tradition.20
Surprisingly, vibrators have a history and tradition of non-regulation.21 This
history begins with their centuries-old, medicinal usage and concludes with
their more recent appearances in the Sears Roebuck catalog as “Aids That
Every Woman Appreciates,” listed along with sewing machines, electric fans,
and household mixers.22 More generally, however, a survey of this history of
sex aids reveals gender bias in the study and understanding of female sexuality.
Part III examines the interaction between gender bias in legal and medical
applications, specifically in the case of sex aids. Bias can operate in a facially
neutral fashion, especially when that bias is deeply embedded in culture.
Ultimately, medical stereotypes can infect case law, and medical bias can
reinforce gender stereotypes in the law.

17. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
18. See discussion, notes 189-195 infra.
19. See supra note 1.
20. Of course, a potential buyer can easily evade such a clumsy law by purchasing “body”
massagers. More than 30 years ago, a book advertised as “[t]he first HOW-TO book for the female who
yearns to be ALL woman,” advised its readers that vibrators were inexpensive and “on display in most
drug stores” and because they were advertised as “facial massagers” they could be purchased without
embarrassment. J., THE SENSUOUS WOMAN 43 (1969). One court judicially noted this fact, stating that
“personal massagers” that can perform as vibrators “are being sold every day at stores such as Wal-Mart
or K-Mart, to customers who intend to use them only for genital stimulation.” State v. Brenan, 739 So.
2d 368, 373, aff’d, 772 S.2d 64 (La. 2000). Indeed, with some marketing skill, the whole problem
disappears, with colorful names such as “Flexi-lover” becoming a “Massag-o-matic.” See Regalado v.
State of Texas, 872 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. App. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
21. See generally RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,” THE
VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN’S SEXUAL SATISFACTION (1999).
22. Id. at 104-05.
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Part IV details how states enforce statutes outlawing devices such as
vibrators and dildos. From arrest through appeal, states take the duty to protect
public morality seriously.
Unlike outdated and unenforced laws, the
prosecutions of these laws result in convictions and jail sentences. These laws
are not just quaint artifacts of an earlier time and place – Alabama’s law was
passed in 199823 – and prosecution under these laws results in convictions and
jail sentences.
Part V seeks legal enlightenment in the Lawrence majority opinion and
searches for clues as to what the decision means for sexual privacy generally,
and for sex aids specifically.
This article concludes that, whether viewed as a right of liberty or privacy,
the government should not have the authority to interfere with private adult
sexual activities, whether with other consenting adults or as assisted by
inanimate objects. This conclusion, however, is coupled with the caution that
the deliberately vague and ambiguous Lawrence decision is not a revival of the
broad Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird approach to privacy.24
In changing the approach from a search for a fundamental right to recognition
of a liberty interest, the Court creates a more open and undefined right. At the
same time, however, the Court reduces the level of scrutiny for government
infringements of the right to one that resembles “rationality with bite.”25
Finally, Lawrence provides many judicial emergency exits for use if future
cases seek to expand the reasoning beyond the Court’s comfort level.
The change in focus is a narrow victory for liberty and privacy interests, at
most shifting the burden to the government to justify its reasons for impinging
those interests. The justification required of the government could be nothing
more than naming a “legitimate” reason. The Lawrence approach, however,
offers liberty and privacy interests as an opportunity for a more heightened
review, but under carefully circumscribed conditions. Its application, not
surprisingly, will depend upon the proclivities of the Court that applies it in the
next case. Perhaps the most important reminder in Lawrence is that the
Supreme Court is often not very far from the national mainstream. Although
the Court may provide a check on outlier jurisdictions, political processes
ultimately provide the primary protection of our individual liberty interests.

23. See Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (N.D.Ala. 2002).
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See
infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
25. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-22
(1972) (describing a level of equal protection scrutiny labeled “mere rationality” by the Supreme Court,
but applied with a more searching judicial inquiry into the legislative means and ends than the traditional
and deferential “toothless” rational basis review).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PRIVACY DOCTRINE
BEFORE LAWRENCE
What is the extent of our constitutional liberty and privacy interests? There
are at least two possible theories: (1) certain fundamental rights exist that, once
established, require the government to justify intrusion upon them with
compelling interests and narrowly tailored means; or (2) a liberty interest exists
in which people retain a certain spatial, decisional, or personal privacy that
requires the government to justify intrusion at some, yet to be defined, level.
The first theory reflects Justice Blackmun’s approach in Roe v. Wade,26 and the
second theory reflects Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence.27 The thirty
years between the issuance of these opinions has been a time of heated
political, social, and academic debate over the limits of judicial interpretation
of the Constitution with privacy rights as the focal point.
Several decades ago, the Supreme Court struggled to find a constitutional
theory that would prevent Connecticut from banning the sale of contraceptives.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that constitutional privacy
protected a married couple’s use of birth control measures.28 The Griswold
opinion relied heavily on the existence of a marital relationship.29 Seven years
later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, this constitutional privacy interest in access to
contraception was extended to unmarried persons.30 The relatively quick jump
that the Supreme Court made in Eisenstadt from married to unmarried persons
seemed to give hope that sex could be uncoupled from marriage, and sexual
privacy protected in its own right.31 The Supreme Court seemed to set the
ground level for the privacy right, not the ceiling: “If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”32 As the Court
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
28. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
29. Id. (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”).
30. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible.”).
31. See id. (“Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”).
32. See id. This ruling came only 45 years after the decision in Buck v. Bell, where the Supreme
Court declared that concern for public health gave the state the power to prevent procreation. Virginia
had authorized sterilization for “mental defectives” and Justice Holmes heartily endorsed the idea and its
constitutionality: “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
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struggled to untangle sex, marriage, and procreation, privacy collided with the
abortion issue in Roe v. Wade,33 where the Supreme Court held that the right of
privacy encompassed a women’s right to choose to have an abortion under
some circumstances. A highly politicized debate overshadowed the legal
doctrine.
From the time of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, the constitutional right of
privacy became the object of an embittered battle among the Justices on the
Supreme Court. A series of subsequent decisions extensively cut back the
expansive and free-floating right enunciated in Roe. In attempts to develop
interpretive tools for broad open-ended language, theories that rest on original
meaning, history and tradition, and the concept of liberty have been testmarketed as ways to develop a safe and effective formula, one that does not
unleash an uncontrollable judicial Frankenstein.34 The Justices who wanted to
expand the doctrine used vague language35 and the Justices who want to
contract it, used narrow language.36
Substantive due process became characterized by a series of confusing
decisions concerning parental rights, suicide, homosexuality, and abortion,
joined by an increasingly eccentric legal doctrine that reflected the internal
disagreements. Identifying the constitutional right to privacy required one to
keep updating an ever-changing master list. The list included: (1) the right to
use contraceptives;37 (2) abortion (sometimes), although the state can make
getting one difficult;38 (3) the right to refuse medical treatment (perhaps);39 (4)
enough “painkillers” for the terminally ill to permanently end suffering

crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.” 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927). But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (striking down, on equal protection grounds, a criminal statute authorizing the sterilization of
thrice-convicted felons, declaring “marriage and procreation [to be] fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race”).
33. The Supreme Court held that this “right of privacy” was “broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
34. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (using history and tradition as the
benchmark “to rein in the subjective elements” and to avoid “the need for complex balancing of
competing interests in every case.”)
35. Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court found a privacy right for married women to use
contraceptives in “penumbras” of specific provisions “formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.” 381 U.S. at 484. Then, in Roe v. Wade, the Justices could not agree
where in the constitution the liberty interest resided, but stated that it was “broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 37-46.
37. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
38. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (finding
women’s right to make a decision to obtain an abortion before fetal viability protected under the
substantive due process doctrine, and state may not subject that right to “undue burdens.”).
39. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (assuming significant
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, but upholding state’s interest in imposing
restrictions on withholding medical treatment in case of person in persistent vegetative state).
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(perhaps), but not physician assisted suicide for the terminally ill;40 and (5) the
right to guide and control your children41 (but not the right of a biological
father to have a relationship with a daughter born of an adulterous relationship
when the biological mother still is married and her husband chooses to raise the
daughter as his own).42 Now, after the Lawrence decision, we can add (6)
adults practicing consensual sodomy in private—although Justice Kennedy
never tagged it with the label “fundamental right.”
The two most successful strategies that some Justices employed in crushing
the substantive due process privacy doctrine were: (1) isolating the privacy
right so narrowly that purporting to raise it to the level of a constitutional right
would seem absurd;43 and (2) requiring a historical pedigree so pure as to
guarantee that majoritarian rule had to have generally protected the right in all
but a few outlier states. 44 In Washington v. Glucksberg, a case examining
whether there was a protected liberty interest in assisted suicide, these
strategies officially became part of the test for finding a fundamental right, and
for achieving a heightened level of scrutiny.45 Without such a level of scrutiny,
a rational relationship test applies. Showing that there is no rational basis for a
given intrusion is often too high a barrier to leap over, although the sporadic
inconsistency of the Supreme Court in applying the test encourages continual
attempts.
According to Glucksberg, to establish a right as fundamental, one first
needs to describe the right specifically. Then, one must show that the
specifically described right is so deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
traditions, and so “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” that “neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.”46 Although this is a
“minimalist’s” test in theory, because it moves constitutional law along at a
case-by
- case pace,47 in practice, newly recruited fundamental rights are
unlikely to survive this constitutional boot camp.

40. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (finding no fundamental right to
assisted suicide).
41. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (invalidating a statute that
prohibited teaching young children in any language other than English and affirmed the fundamental
right of an individual “. . .to marry, establish a home and bring up children.”); Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925) (striking down a law requiring parents to send their children to public
school, as “unreasonably interfer[ing] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (holding
there is a fundamental right of parents to make decisions regarding child’s care, custody and control).
42. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
43. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. See infra text accompanying notes 49-59.
44. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 201 (1993)
(“[t]radition has more recently become almost a litmus test – an all but insuperable bar to the litigant
who fails to invoke it in support of a new constitutional claim”).
45. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
46. Id. at 721 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
47. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999).
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There were many problems with the Glucksberg test and its application
including: (1) the initial phrasing of the right; (2) the sometimes-dubious appeal
to history and tradition; and (3) the poison pill outcome. As to the latter effect,
the Glucksberg test defines a fundamental right, ostensibly endorsing the
concept, but the test itself kills any hope of ever finding a fundamental right.
Justice Scalia’s dissent is correct that the Lawrence opinion does not follow this
immediate past precedent.48 As discussed below, that the Glucksberg test may
be temporarily interred—perhaps to be recalled when convenient—is no reason
to mourn.
A. Fundamental Rights under a Microscope
Like the conventional wisdom that a lawyer wins or loses a trial case when
choosing the jury, whether an activity “wins” fundamental right status often
seems to depend on how broadly or narrowly the courts frame the question
before them. Requiring specificity in the definition of a fundamental right is a
relatively recent development in the doctrine of substantive due process,49 and
one not friendly to the concept of fundamental rights generally. It allows one
to make the question the variable, and the desired answer, the constant; by
being very specific, one can craft a rhetorical question where the obvious
answer will exclude the questioned activity from coverage as a fundamental
right.50 In other words, ask a silly question and you will get a silly answer.
Griswold and Eisenstadt both involved the ban on the sale of
contraceptives, and the Supreme Court phrased the issue as one involving the
constitutional right to decide whether to procreate, not the constitutional right
to buy a condom.51 The question asked was a general and philosophical one,
not one directed to the specific methodology or circumstances involved in
exercising the right. In the later cases, however, the Court abandoned this
broad approach to framing the question for a more constricted one. Thus, a
privacy right was not phrased as whether people had “the right to be let alone,”
but rather whether they had the right to engage in homosexual sodomy,52 not to
determine the manner and circumstances of one’s death when terminally ill, but
to commit suicide,53 not to have a relationship with a biological child, but to

48. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488.
49. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
50. See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 420 (1947) (Frankfurter. J., dissenting)
(“But answers are not obtained by putting the wrong question and thereby begging the real one.”).
51. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). Contrast Justice Blackmun’s dissent where he
framed the right as “the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations with others” because they are necessary to “an individual’s self-definition.” Id. at
204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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have a relationship with a biological child born of an adulterous relationship
where the mother and her husband decide to raise the child as their own.54
There are many examples of the absurd results that this approach produces.
For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the plurality stated that “[w]e have
found nothing in the older sources, nor in the older cases, addressing
specifically the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child
born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man.”55 The failure to
prove this very specific protection in our history and tradition meant that the
biological father of a child, who had an established relationship with the child,
had no constitutional right to any parental relationship with the child. The key
to this result was emphasizing specifically that the biological father was an
adulterer and the child’s mother chose to stay within her marriage–facts that
overrode the more general presumption that a parent and child had a
constitutionally protected relationship.56 The child’s claim to a relationship
with her biological father was dismissed because the plurality asserted that
there was no support in our history or traditions that a state had to “recognize
multiple fatherhood.” 57
The same game can be played in the cases involving sex aids. At one point
in the Williams litigation, the Eleventh Circuit sent the case back down to the
district court with instructions to determine “whether our nation has a deeply
rooted history of state interference, or state non-interference, in the private
sexual activity of married or unmarried persons.”58 Contrast that result with
another more specific question a different court framed when considering the
same issue: “Does the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee a citizen the right to stimulate his, her or another’s genitals with an
object designed or marketed primarily for that purpose? Put another way, is
there a right to stimulate human genital organs with an object designed or
marketed as useful primarily for that purpose, such that the right is a
‘fundamental’ one ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty?’”59

54. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
55. Id. at 125.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 131. The plurality opinion does not hide its moral judgment of the parties. Introducing
the relationship of the four main parties, Justice Scalia notes, “The facts of this case are, we must hope,
extraordinary.” Id. at 113. In other words, the world of Michael and Carol, and Gerald and Victoria was
literally a Peyton Place. To prove the point about our histories and traditions, the opinion takes us back
to 1836 and H. Nicholas’ Alduterine Bastardy, and of course, Blackstone’s explanation of the exception
was “be out of the kingdom of England . . . for above nine months.” See id. at 124 (citing WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 456 (J. Chitty ed. 1826)). Apparently, at that point, even the law could
not tolerate the legal fiction necessary to paper over the marital schism. Of course, all of the policy
judgments that girded these commentators’ reasoning melt away in these days of DNA tests where
paternity can be determined with relative ease. No one asks whether Blackstone would have commented
the same way if there had been DNA testing in England at the time of his writing.
58. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2001).
59. Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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It is not hard to discern the nature of this game. Framing the question in a
particular way provides an easy way to influence the outcome. Asking the
question at a very specific level is not only a way to constrict the doctrine, but
to shut it down if that outcome is preferred.
B. Tradition and History
As articulated in the Glucksberg test, history and tradition are a critical part
of analyzing a substantive due process challenge. It is not a method, however,
without some madness attached to it.60 First, protection of rights consistent
with tradition privileges the present ruling order because the notions
traditionally accepted by the electorate are granted with an extra layer of
legitimacy. Moreover, even assuming an intellectual pedigree can be assigned
to the requirement,61 determining what history is traced, during what period,
and through whose lens it is viewed, all present significant choices that will
determine what one produces as the historical record.62 In the hands of
lawyers, history may become an adversarial tool to justify a result, rather than
an accurate picture of our past to inform the result.63
The description of the history and tradition of an activity’s regulation may
vary depending upon the perspective of the viewer. The Lawrence decision, for
example, criticizes the inaccuracy of the historical analysis of the Bowers
decision that came to the opposite conclusion on the historical regulation of
homosexual sodomy. 64 Lawrence looked at evolving history in a very specific
manner, while Bowers looked at the history in a more general manner. 65

60. See generally Adam B. West, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57
U. MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002).
61. Id.
62. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 98, 99 (1991);
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1995).
63. Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History,
13 J.L. & POL’Y 809 (1997); Brown, supra note 44, at 210-11.
64. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (“In summary, the historical grounds relied upon in
Bowersare more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger
indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”).
It is ironic that the Lawrence court added a new dimension of specificity to the Glucksberg
test, given the existing, restrictive requirement that the right be described in specific terms. In
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy searches for a history and tradition of prosecution of homosexual sodomy
conducted in private by two consenting adults—a very specific description— opposed to a history of
statutes outlawing sodomy. The Lawrence court used “specificity” with regard to this prong of the test
as a tool for expanding the scope of matters historically protected. The more specific one is, however,
the harder it is to spot a tradition or history that will bar the claim. It is easier to find a “history and
tradition” at a general level. It is a way to turn history and tradition into an easily manipulated rule.
65. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (“ Sodomy was a criminal offense at common
law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights . . .
In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had
criminal sodomy laws . . . In fact, until 1961. . . all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and
the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults.”)(citations omitted).
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Furthermore, the historical framework is not always suitable because we are
often forced to fit very specific medical and technological advances (such as
assisted reproduction) into the framers’ linguistically challenging phrasing,
composed in a time when leeches and bleeding were accepted as good medical
practices.
Finally, the requirement that the right must be deeply rooted in tradition
and history is relatively recent.66 There was no such requirement in Roe with
regard to abortion, or Griswold67 and Eisenstadt68 with regard to
contraceptives.
Indeed, Roe illustrated the difficulty of applying the
requirement through the majority and dissenting opinions, which came to two
contrary conclusions on the historical issue.69
Thus, Justices Kennedy and Scalia debated in Lawrence which part of the
historical timeline should count when history reflects different standards.
Although Texas did not recognize it, Justice Kennedy emphasized an
“emerging recognition” and acceptance of homosexual sodomy,70 while Justice
Scalia maintained that the fact that sodomy was criminalized at some point in
this timeline sufficiently rebuts the notion that the right to engage in this act
was ever deeply rooted.71 In Justice Kennedy’s view, our most recent past
becomes our history and tradition. By using “recent history,” he reconstructed
the dead hand of the past and fashioned it into a reflection of present national
majority will, or even international will.72 Recent history then is used to pull
the outlier jurisdictions into the fold. This new approach is perhaps as
troubling as the Glucksberg test,73 however, because what the majority wants
now is generally protected by the majority at the polls, and we are as lost as
ever in determining the core “liberty” or “privacy” values that the Constitution
protects.
Moreover, gender discrimination infects history, and when a historical
pedigree is required to justify a fundamental right, it ensures that gender

66. See discussion accompanying notes 49-57, supra.
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86, 505 (1965). See generally Wolf, supra note
60
, at 119 -120 (“Historically, misogynistic attitudes have proscribed the availability of contraceptives.
Such attitudes often were codified by statute, including the very laws held unconstitutional in Eisenstadt
and Griswold, which were on the books for more than eighty and ninety years, respectively.”) (citing
Reva Siegal, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions
of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 356 (1992)).
68. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
69. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-47 (1973), with id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century
are of most relevance here.”).
71. Id. at 2494.
72. In relying on domestic indicators, Justice Kennedy noted the Model Penal Code and the repeal
of state criminal sodomy laws. Id. at 2480. He also noted recent European government actions that
supported his view. Id. at 2481.
73. See supra note 45.
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discrimination is embedded in the fundamental rights analysis.74 This
phenomenon is critical in the area of female sexuality. The law historically not
only treats women as second-class citizens, but also granted males dominion
over female bodies and sexuality.75 For example, one might claim a
fundamental right to one’s own decisional and bodily autonomy in refusing
sexual intercourse, even within a marriage. Yet the history and tradition of
male ownership of the female body, as exemplified in the marital rape
exemption, would rebuff this claim.76 In part, the marital rape exception was
entwined with biased medical accounts of women’s sexuality that claimed that
sexual intercourse with a conscious and healthy woman was not possible
without her consent.77 Thus, an analysis that respects our nation’s history and
traditions can easily be an analysis that respects gender discrimination as well.
Chief Justice Burger provided us with another vivid illustration of the
problem of male centered history.78 In his concurring opinion in the now
overruled Bowers case, he emphasized that there was “no such thing as a
fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy,” relying in part for authority
on Blackstone’s description of sodomy as an offense of “deeper malignity”
than rape and “a crime not fit to be named.”79 This is easy for Blackstone to
say and Burger to cite; as males, they probably did not fear the predatory sexual
violence of rape.80 That lack of empathy led them to make the insensitive and
erroneous judgment that consensual sodomy is more horrific than rape.81
74. Nor is this criticism a revolutionary one. Abigail Adams admonished founding father John
Adams to “remember the ladies,” as he set out to frame the new government, but he replied, “[w]e know
better than to repeal our Masculine systems.” 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370, 382 (1963).
75. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); Jill Elaine Hasday,
Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (detailing the
history of the marital rape exemption).
76. See Hasday, supra note 75.
77. See Elizabeth Ann Mills, One Hundred Years of Fear: Rape and the Medical Profession, in
JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF: WOMEN, GENDER ROLES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29, 44-45 (Nicole
Hahn Rafter & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1982); Morris Ploscowe, SEX AND THE LAW 170-74 (1951)
(noting the medical experts’ opinion that women in good health cannot be raped because they should be
able to resist penetration).
78. See MAINES, supra note 21, at 65 (noting male bias in the interpretation of data by male
historians). This point extends to interpretations of medical data as well. Id.
79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 215.)
80. Blackstone reflected the unenlightened approach of his time, but that is no excuse for repeating
the mistakes of history. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430-33; see also 2 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 109 (New York, O. Halstead 1827) (“The general rule is,
that the husband becomes entitled, upon the marriage, to all the goods and chattels of the wife, and to the
rents and profits of her lands, and he becomes liable to pay her debts, and perform her contracts.”). See
generally NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 51-54 (1982) (summarizing analysis of Blackstone’s
COMMENTARIES). See also Hasday, supra note 75 (detailing the history of the marital rape exception).
81. The replication of gender discrimination within the rubric of “tradition” is also present in
Justice Scalia’s dissent in an equal protection case that forced Virginia to allow the admission of women
into its all-male military academy. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 569 (Scalia J.,
dissenting) (1996) (arguing that the all male military academy was justified by analogizing to the
“tradition of sending only men into military combat.”).
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C. Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty
The last part of the Glucksberg test, that the right must be “‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it] were sacrificed,’”82 is the prong that acts as the failsafe mechanism. It sets
up an exceedingly difficult barrier.83 The test protects only those rights
essential to the functioning of a democratic society, such as those already
specifically listed in the Bill of Rights and possibly a few others, such as the
right to be free of torture.84 Whether the right of privacy in this context would
meet that standard is an open question. Torture or forced medication or life
support could be distinguished based on their affirmative intrusion into bodily
integrity. Moreover, “ordered liberty” is a double-edged concept and can be
used as easily to justify government intrusions into liberty as it can be to protect
liberty interests from government intrusion.85 Thus, this prong is too vague and
malleable to serve as a protective layer for privacy rights in general or sexual
privacy rights specifically.
For those who dislike the implications of the doctrine of substantive due
process and do not want to try struggling with the many difficult issues it
raises, the Glucksberg test is the perfect solution. By offering three
independent grounds on which a fundamental right can be denied, the
Glucksberg test allows Justices to maintain fealty to the theory while
simultaneously rejecting all claims with ease.

82. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). The phrase “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” is drawn from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). Palko employed this
phrase to test which provisions of the Bill of Rights were fundamental enough to be incorporated against
the states through the concept of liberty in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
83. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 62, at 104 (“Through his [tradition] methodology,
Rehnquist, like Scalia, is engaging in damage control; his concerns are not merely to decline to extend
[fundamental rights], but also to gut the cases of any vitality or generative force.”); Brown, supra note
44
.
84. Palko rejected the proposition that immunity “from compulsory self-incrimination” was part of
the “essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” but did state that “[n]o doubt there would remain the need
to give protection against torture, physical or mental.” 302 U.S. at 325-26. The Supreme Court later
held that the right to jury trial was incorporated based on the test that the guarantee “was fundamental to
the American scheme of justice,” rather than the theoretical inquiry of whether the right was necessary
to democratic government. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
85. See Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (2003) (stressing concept of government’s
interest in “ordered liberty” in the context of a court determining whether the forced administration of
drugs to render a defendant competent to stand trial is justified).
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II. TRADITION, HISTORY, AND HYSTERIA: FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE
HISTORY OF VIBRATORS
In recent opinions such as Glucksberg86 and Lawrence,87 the Supreme
Court has made the discussion of history and tradition a mandatory part of any
substantive due process conversation. The Lawrence opinion spends a great
deal of time arguing that private, consensual sodomy was not historically
prosecuted, criticizing the opposite conclusion reached by the Court in Bowers
v. Hardwick,88 and illustrating the slippery nature of the Court’s historical test.
It is unclear from the Lawrence opinion, however, what the relevant referential
timeframe is, and what level of protection or lack thereof needs to be present.
Moreover, even if we set aside the question of whether there is a sound and
consistent method to arrive at a decisive statement of history and tradition, an
analysis of the history of sex aids supports finding a privacy interest in private
adult use of sex aids. First, private adult masturbation traditionally has not
been criminalized.89 Likewise, there is no significant history or tradition of
regulating sex aids such a vibrators and genital massage. In fact, there is a
tradition of their legal use, although one coupled with a history of medical
misunderstanding and ignorance of women’s sexuality.
A. A Miracle Cure without a Disease
Physicians used genital massage as early as the middle 1600’s to treat
female “hysteria” or “womb disease.”90 The symptoms of womb disease
included fainting, insomnia, headaches, and, of course, the tendency to be very
cranky.91 The invention of electricity sped up the treatment by allowing the
rather lengthy hand massage process to be reduced to a ten-minute treatment.92
86. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
87. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
88. 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
89. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 207 (1992) (“. . . masturbation (at least when solitary
and in private) has never been made a crime, even though both in the early Christian era and in Victorian
England (and America) it was regarded. . . as a serious offense against good morals, a crime against
unborn generations, a factor predisposing the perpetrator to sex crimes, and a form of attempted suicide,
all rolled into one.”). See generally Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1277-94 (reviewing history
and tradition of sexual privacy in marriage); THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF MASTURBATION (2003).
90. See generally MAINES, supra note 21. A 1653 medical text written by Pieter van Foreest
described the treatment: “[M]assage the genitalia with one finger inside, using oil of lilies, musk root,
crocus, or similar.” Id. at 1. The word “hysteria” comes from the Greek word meaning “that which
proceeds from the uterus.” Id. at 21. Maines notes that the word “[h]ysterical thus combines in its
connotations the pejorative elements of femininity and of the irrational: there is no analogous word
“testerical” to describe, for example, male sports fans’ behavior during the Super Bowl.” Id.
91. Id. at 1, 8, 23.
92. Id. The first patented vibratory machine, called “The Manipulator,” was steam powered and as
big as a dining room. It came with the warning that supervision of females was necessary “to prevent
overindulgence.” Id. at 15. Portable, at-home vibrators came into fashion in the early 1900’s. Sears
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Doctors apparently saw the benefits of using faster electrical devices to treat
more patients and bring in more fees.93 Genital massage was lauded as a
miracle cure for its ability to alleviate so many different symptoms so quickly.
Before the American Psychiatric Association caught on and changed the
medical criteria in 1952, “hysteria” was “one of the most frequently diagnosed
diseases in history.”94
Over the centuries, a variety of devices were invented to supplement or
replace hand massage.95 Indirect methods such as horseback riding, train
travel, the vibrations of a sewing machine, and bicycles all had their
adherents.96 Other devices, such as vibrating helmets and jolting chairs met
with mixed success.97 Electromechanical vibrators were used in medicine in
1878.98 Both men and women were treated with these devices.
The at-home version of the cure appeared publicly at the turn of the
twentieth century. An advertisement for a home vibrator named “Vibratile”
turned up in McClure’s magazine in March 1899, promising a cure for
“Neuralgia, Headache, and Wrinkles.”99 The “American Vibrator,” advertised
that the device “may be attached to any electric light socket, can be used by
yourself in the privacy of dressing room or boudoir, and furnishes every
woman with the very essence of perpetual youth.”100 Vibrating genital
massagers were sold in the Sears Roebuck catalog until the 1920s, ranging in
price from $5.95 to $28.75 for the deluxe model.101 As smaller electrical
handheld vibrators were developed, the role of the medical profession
disappeared with no real resistance from physicians, perhaps because the time
Roebuck listed its vibrator under “Aids That Every Woman Appreciates.” Advertisements featured the
vibrator, described as “very useful and satisfactory for home service,” along with sewing machines and
household mixers. Id. at 104-105.
93. Doctors apparently considered genital massage time-consuming, messy, and hard on the wrists.
Id. at 4, 67-68.
94. Id. at 3-5, 11. Not all physicians, however, were in favor of the cure of genital massage to
induce orgasm; when the speculum came into use as an examination tool, there was concern that it acted
as a dangerous device for inducing orgasmic pleasure. For instance, Maines quotes one physician in
1853 sounding the alarm:
No one who has realized the amount of moral evil wrought in girls . . . whose prurient desires
have been increased by Indian Hemp [marijuana] and partially gratified by medical
manipulations, can deny that remedy is worse than the disease [hysteria]. I have . . . seen
young unmarried women, of the middle-class of society, reduced by the constant use of the
speculum to the mental and moral condition of prostitutes; seeking to give themselves the
same indulgence by the practice of solitary vice; and asking every medical practitioner . . . to
institute an examination of the sexual organs.
Id. At 58 (quoting ROBERT BRUDENELL CARTER, ON PATHOLOGY AND TREATMENT OF HYSTERIA 69
(London, John Churchill 1853)).
95. Id. at 67-110.
96. A book that directed how best to achieve this excitement, in these situations, went through six
editions and twenty-seven printings by 1923. Id. at 89-90.
97. Id. at 91.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 100.
100. Id. at 103 (quoting GOOD HEALTH PUBLISHING COMPANY, TWENTIETH CENTURY
THERAPEUTIC APPLIANCES 64-73(1909).
101. Id. at 104-05.
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required for the treatment was annoying even before the time constraints of
managed care.102
Despite the use of vibrators and genital massage as a medical therapy to
induce orgasm in women, it is far from clear that a woman’s sexual pleasure
was in itself important, as opposed to an occasional nuisance to be satisfied as a
remedy for other ailments. During the nineteenth century, expert opinion was
that sexual intercourse was healthy for women, but there was a difference of
opinion as to whether orgasm was required.103 Of course, recognizing the
importance of intercourse, without a corresponding role for female orgasm,
satisfied male concerns with a minimum of effort. Expert concern centered on
the fear that “manipulation of the clitoris by the partner or by the woman
herself would lead directly to compulsive masturbation, nymphomania, or an
outright rejection of intercourse.”104 The anxiety about the “potential to
unsettle heterosexual hierarchies” translated into medical apathy at best and
conscious disregard at worst.105 Medical textbooks ignored the clitoris,106
although there is some evidence that, in the 1920s and 1930s in the United
States, “expert” opinion in marital sex manuals reflected the importance of
female orgasm and clitoral stimulation, but placed responsibility for achieving
both upon the male partner.107
B. Freudian Slips
From the 1930s to the 1960s, vibrator advertising disappeared.108
Concerns were expressed about female addiction to the device and “male

102. Id. at 67. As Maines notes, there is no evidence that the physicians enjoyed the task of
remedying hysteria. Id. at 4, 67, 113-14 (“All the evidence points to their having generally considered it
a tedious, difficult, and time-consuming chore and having made efforts to delegate the task to
subordinates or machines even in ancient and medieval times.”).
103. See id. at 53; Jane Gerhard, Revisiting “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm”: The Female
Orgasm in American Sexual Thought and Second Wave Feminism, 26 FEMINIST STUD. 449, 452 (2000).
104. Gerhard, supra note 103, at 452; see also MAINES, supra note 21, at 53-54.
105. Gerhard, supra note 103, at 452.
106. See Gerhard, supra note 103, at 452 (“Early-nineteenth-century anatomy textbooks noted the
existence of the clitoris but believed that, unlike the supposedly analogous penis, the clitoris was passive
and unimportant to female sexual expression. By the twentieth century, most, including the industry
standard Gray’s Anatomy, did not label the clitoris or discuss its function.”).
107. The mixed message of these manuals was that women had sexual “needs,” but it was a man’s
job to awaken and satisfy those needs. See Jessamyn Neuhause, The Importance of Being Orgasmic:
Sexuality, Gender, and Marital Sex Manuals in the United States, 1920-1963, 9 J. HIST. SEXUALITY,
447, 457-460 (2000) (“If a woman suffered from frigidity, wrote many authors, the blame most likely
lay with a clumsy, selfish, or ignorant husband . . . [O]rgasmic sexual pleasure was critical to a woman’s
good health. Masculine sexual power was absolutely essential, but husbands were bumbling, ignorant,
insensitive clods who needed a good course of instruction on pleasuring wives. These contradictions in
post-World War I manuals reflect a society grappling with ‘the woman question.’”).
108. MAINES, supra note 21, at 108. After an advertisement in the December 1928 issue of
Popular Mechanics, Maines notes the absence of vibrator advertising “from home magazines until the
modern vibrator resurfaced in the 1960’s as a frankly sexual toy.” Id.
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dismay at its efficacy compared to their own efforts.”109 The shift in focus
from the female orgasm to male orgasm was reflected in the post World War II
sex manuals that “emphasized the male’s pleasure when defining successful
intercourse and made women’s sexual technique responsible for male sexual
satisfaction.”110 Unlike the earlier sex manuals of the 1920s and 1930s, these
later sex manuals did not put much stock in the importance of female orgasm,
finding it overemphasized the responsibility of the woman, and even
unnecessary — urging women to acquire the art of “faking it.”111
The popularity of Sigmund Freud’s theories of sexuality was apparent.
Freud constructed a theory of female sexuality that distinguished between
clitoral and vaginal sexuality, referring to the former as the “immature” form
and the latter as the “mature.”112 Freud’s theory, in summary, was that a young
girl’s heterosexual identity “would be consolidated only when the girl shifted
her libido away from the mother and the clitoris and on to the father and the
vagina.”113 Much depended upon this transfer, because if not completed,
neurotic discontent, penis envy, hysteria, and hostility toward men could
result.114 Psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch carried the Freudian theory further
into “healthy” subordination: “the vagina symbolically brought together
women’s reproductive and sexual identities, two aspects of women’s
psychology that psychoanalysis sought to harmonize under the rubric of innate
heterosexuality.”115 There was a label for those women who did not renounce
their clitoris: “frigid.”116

109. Id. at 107. In one study, it was asserted that use of an electrical vibrator could produce as
many as fifty consecutive orgasms, a stunning number that could support the “excess” claim. See
CAROL TRAVIS & CAROLE WADE, THE LONGEST WAR: SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE, 92-93 (2d
ed. 1984).
110. Neuhause, supra note 107, at 467.
111. Id. at 468 (“In the ‘50’s male sexuality was no longer an unquestioned force, needing only
restraint and training. Nor was the husband admonished for his sexual inability. Instead the wife was
urged to take more responsibility, to cater to her husband’s needs, and to be aware of the anxiety that a
man faced in bed.”).
112. See Gerhard, supra note 103, at 452-53; MAINES, supra note 21, at 118.
113. Gerhard, supra note 103, at 453.
114. SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (1905), reprinted in 21 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, 73-109. (James Strachey ed. &
trans., 1953-1974).
115. See Gerhard, supra note 103, at 455. Gerhard notes that Deutsch explained that “[v]aginal
sexuality, at once mysterious and overpowering, transformed a girl into a woman through its capacity to
bring sexual pleasure and reproduction together.” Id. at 455.
116. The category of the “frigid” or abnormal women was a broad one in the 1930s and 1940s:
Technically, psychoanalysts labeled a woman frigid if she was unable to reach vaginal
orgasm through intercourse. But as a diagnosis, frigidity also contained other related
concerns about what constituted normal female sexuality. For instance, if a woman was too
sexual or too aggressive, she was labeled frigid. Similarly, if a woman did not enjoy
intercourse but did enjoy other forms of sexual exchange, she too was ‘frigid.’ At the same
time, frigid women also included those deemed to be ‘neurotically undersexual’ or who cared
nothing for sexual pleasure. Frigidity thus became a label and a diagnosis that defined how
much sexual desire a woman must have and in what kinds of sexual behavior she must
engage to be ‘healthy.’
Id.
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Not only did personal psychological problems flow from the clitoris, but
broader societal tragedy as well, including the chaos of women overwhelming
men and the resultant destruction of the family.117 Acceptance of the roles of
wife and mother, as well as general passivity were considered normal and
crucial.118 Sexuality was male-centered, culturally established, and labeled as
science. If women’s sexual satisfaction stemmed from the clitoris—and thus
could be achieved independently—then the subordinate and dependent role of
women intrinsic to the contemporary understandings of both family and
sexuality would be challenged.
C. More Theories of Female Sexuality
Freud’s theories conveniently maximized male sexual pleasure by redefining female sexual pleasure. Yet other studies of human sexual behavior,
such as those by Kinsey and by Masters and Johnson lent support to the notion
that the vagina was not the center of female sexual pleasure.119 Masters and
Johnson’s famous study of sexuality, however, involved female subjects who
were chosen because they reached orgasm through coitus.120 In 1976, Shere
Hite pointed this flaw out in her own study: obtaining a representative sample
of women who would openly discuss their sexuality, especially when they often
suffer from the stigmatizing condition of a lack of orgasm, would never be
easy.121
In the late 1960s, some women began challenging the Freudian vision of
female sexuality. In “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,”122 Anna Koedt
confronted this version of sexuality that had become rooted in not only
psychoanalysis, but also medicine and popular culture. As Koedt noted, the
“worst damage was done to the mental health of women who either suffered
silently with self-blame, or flocked to psychiatrists looking desperately for the
hidden and terrible repression that had kept them from their vaginal destiny.”123
Other women writers also began exploring this theme of the interplay between
female sexuality and male domination.124 There was no single voice but the
117. Id. at 458; see also, THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS
(1990) (Freud as propagator of the “cultural myth of the vaginal orgasm.”).
118. Id.
119. See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 592 (1953)
(noting that the vagina was “of minimum importance in contributing to the erotic responses of the
female . . . [and] may even contribute more to the sexual arousal of the male than it does to the arousal
of the female.”) See also WILLIAM MASTERS & VIRGINIA JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE
(1966).
120. PAUL ROBINSON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX: HAVELOCK ELLIS, ALFRED KINSEY,
WILLIAM MASTERS, AND VIRGINIA JOHNSON 137 (1976).
121. SHERE HITE, THE HITE REPORT: A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF FEMALE SEXUALITY (1976).
122. Anne Koedt, The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, in RADICAL FEMINISM 198 (Anne Koedt et al.,
eds., 1973).
123. Id. at 199.
124. Gerhard, supra note 103, at 449.
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“celebration of sexual freedom and the critique of sexual liberation, sex as
pleasure and as danger, as liberation and exploitation.”125 This celebration of
female sexuality126 was soon submerged by competing efforts to deal with
violence against women, workplace disparities, and issues of reproduction and
motherhood.127 This effort to change our society’s approach to issues such as
rape and sexual harassment has reinforced images of the role of sex in the law
as violent and threatening.128 It is not surprising, given the massive legal and
cultural barriers to equality and autonomy that women have faced, that little
emphasis placed on women’s erotic selves,129 and that other issues, including
motherhood and work, have occupied the movement’s attention.130 The culture
may be changing, however. The next generation may be both less scared and
scarred by this history.
The medical establishment has only recently begun a serious exploration of
female sexuality. The dearth of clinical trials and resultant data has created a
serious information gap. More research is needed in a variety of areas,131
including the “determinants of sexual desire in women.”132 The clitoris, now
believed to be the centerpiece of female sexual response, has received little

125. Id. at 472.
126. In 1969, The Sensuous Woman brought cheap advice to women for achieving an orgasm:
practice, practice, practice J., The Sensuous Woman 42-49(1969) (“Remember you are training your
body to become a superb instrument of love. You’ll never accomplish this with sporadic lessons . . . .
After you have become accustomed to it, keep adding to the number of orgasms you achieve in each
session. The minimum you should settle for is three or four and you should try for ten to twenty-five.”).
Although practicing alone with a vibrator was recommended, the end game was learning the technique
for contact with men, who would never have the patience to help you. A more feminist approach was
presented in THE BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES—A BOOK
BY AND FOR WOMEN 44-48 (1976).
127. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182 (2001) (“. . . legal feminism has, by and large, reduced questions of sexuality
to two principal concerns for women: dependency, and the responsibilities that motherhood entails, and
danger, such as sexual harassment, rape, incest, and domestic violence . . . Curiously, since the end of
the so-called “sex wars” in the 1980s, it seems that legal feminists have ceded to queer theorists the job
of imagining the female body as a site of pleasure, intimacy, and erotic possibility.”).
128. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 75, at 218; Catherine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE L. J. 1281, 1293-94 (1991).
129. See Franke, supra note 127, at 181 (“Without a doubt, when it comes to sex, [feminists] have
done a more than adequate job of theorizing the right to say no, but we have left to others the task of
understanding what it might mean to say yes.”).
130. Id. at 183 (“The centrality, presumption, and inevitability of our responsibility for children
remain a starting point for many, if not most, legal feminists.”). See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995).
131. See generally Rosemary Basson et al., Report of the International Consensus Development
Conference on Female Sexual Dysfunction: Definitions and Classifications, 163 J. UROLOGY 888, 890
(2000) (“Female sexual dysfunction is an under-researched and poorly understood area . . . . Anatomical
studies are needed to delineate more precisely the pathway of vital nerves, arterial inflow and venous
drainage of the multiple organs involved in normal female sexual function. . . . Biological mechanisms
of sexual arousal and orgasm in women are poorly understood at present . . .”)
132. See Jennifer R. Berman & Irwin Goldstein, Female Sexual Dysfunction, 28 UROLOGY CLINICS
OF NORTH AMERICA 405 (2001) (on file with author) (“Berman and Goldstein”).
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specific attention.133 Despite the fact that more than half of all women, as
reported in the Kinsey and Hite reports, do not experience orgasm through
penetration alone,134 the reasons behind women’s lack of sexual responsiveness
have generally been ignored. 135
In summary, although the medical establishment invested little energy in
the science of the female sexual response, it started out with some practical
information about what seemed to work. Vibrators were legally sold for many
years, and medically endorsed as a means to achieving orgasms in women.
When Freud posited an elaborate theory on the importance of the female
orgasm, this theory supported cultural norms regarding female sexuality that
assumed female subservience and dependence on men, and diminished the
importance of the female clitoral orgasm.136 Although vibrators have a history
and tradition of unregulated use, it is a history and tradition laced with gender
discrimination. Although current constitutional doctrine assesses a practice
according to the depth of its entanglement in history, this history of vibrators is
a stark reminder that learning from history is often a better approach than
repeating history.
III. REGULATION OF SEX AIDS: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
WOMEN
Throughout history, anatomical differences between men and women
defined social and political rights, in turn reinforcing a culture of gender roleplaying. Deeply embedded cultural and legal roles are hard to shed. Trying to
undo the vast number of gender stereotypes embedded in government
regulation required challengers to emphasize similarities and minimize
differences, lest the differences be seized upon to justify discrimination.137 For
example, recent equal protection analysis has chipped away at the legal barriers
that prevent individuals from breaking out of gendered roles in public life.138
In breaking down explicit gender based rules, many of the legal cases have
emphasized equality between male and female, the minimal nature of gender

133. See id. at 408. Berman & Goldstein note that:
In anatomy texts, the clitoris is not displayed accurately in terms of size, and its
neurovascular supply rarely is described. The bulbs are omitted, or, if described, their
relationship to other cavernous tissue is not described.
134. HITE, supra note 121, at 229-34.
135. See generally, Berman & Goldstein, supra note 132.
136. MAINES, supra note 21, at 112.
137. See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1673 (1997)(“By
championing a norm of gender neutrality, this strategy [of eliminating government regulation of gender
roles] also reflected the assumption that state inaction with respect to gender would best ensure women’s
equality.”)
138. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho statute preferring men to
women as administrators of estates); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down
prohibition of entry of women into state’s military academy on equal protection grounds).
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differences, and how women are capable of competing fully with men.139
Although a step ahead in the journey towards a new tradition and history of
equality, there are problems with this approach. First, where there are distinct
differences between male and female, the law often fails to take account of
them.140 Second, in taking into account legitimate differences, courts and
society may compensate in ways that make it worse.141 Third, gender
discrimination is often the by-product of a male-ordered society where
women’s needs are disregarded in the legislative calculus resulting in
legislation that is facially neutral and disparate in its impact.142 Finally, the
discrimination may be the product of private discrimination, and therefore not
amenable to constitutional challenge.143 The difficulty is proving intentional
discrimination, as opposed to conscious ignorance or benign obliviousness.144
Nevertheless, equality cannot be achieved without recognizing obvious
differences while simultaneously not yielding to the temptation to confuse them
with purely culturally conditioned responses. For example, achieving equality
in the home and workplace for parents means a blunt recognition of some
biological responsibilities that cannot be divided (giving birth and breastfeeding), along with all the social responsibilities that can be divided (almost
every other aspect of raising a child), and then re-writing the roles to change
the work and home scene.145
To state the obvious, the male and female anatomies differ, but these
differences have both more and less importance than our culture has
recognized.146 Medical care, based on different anatomies, may be different in
139. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541-42.
140. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 137 at 1673 (“Despite its success, this strategy [enforcing the
norm of gender neutrality] may have overestimated the value of gender neutrality and underestimated
the possibilities for affirmative state intervention on behalf of women.”); MacKinnon, supra note 128, at
1288
- 89. (“Where the analogy seems to work, that is, where the sexes are reasonably fungible and the
inequalities can be seen to function similarly—as in some elite employment situations, for example—
equality law can work for sex. Where the sexes are different, and sexism does not readily appear to
work like racism—as with sexual abuse and reproductive control, for example—discrimination as a
legal theory does not even come up.”); Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
453, 455 (1995) (noting failure of the Supreme Court to consider equal protection issues with regard to
regulations governing reproduction such as abortion).
141. For example, divorce reforms that made laws gender neutral and removed custody
presumptions in favor of the mother ended up hurting many women, especially financially. See
LEONORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
142. See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that although 98% of women
were excluded from a facially neutral veteran’s preference scheme, no equal protection violation was
found because some men were excluded from receiving the preference as well).
143. Higgins, supra note, 137 at 1674.
144. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 296-324 (1997) (concluding that under current precedent, the Supreme
Court will only strike down facially neutral legislation “when the only plausible conclusion is that
discrimination caused the result that is in question.”).
145. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000).
146. See generally NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1998).
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a number of key respects.147 For instance, the nature of women’s sexual drives
has not been adequately emphasized or medically explored.148 Moreover, the
inaccurate belief persists that what pleases men sexually pleases women
generally.149 But what is sauce for the goose is not always sauce for the
gander. The anatomical and psychological differences between men and
women play a critical role in their different sexual responses, as do cultural
roles and lack of sex education.150 Until recently, little attention has been paid
to these differences. Ignorance hardly has resulted in bliss in these
circumstances.
When states have banned vibrators and other sex aids,151 litigation
strategies challenging these laws have reinforced existing biases involving
women’s sexuality. Lawyers have framed their arguments in a language that
asserts that banning these devices would harm women who need them
medically to achieve orgasm. The reality is that many healthy women find
their normal sexual needs often are met with sex aids better than through
traditional male-female sexual positions.
Use of the terms “dysfunction” and “medical need” in litigation reinforces
a view of female sexuality through a male-oriented lens.152 Instead of fighting
for general recognition that the use of vibrators makes achievement of orgasm
easier for a broad range of women, past litigation strategies have opted to chip
away at the laws by using socially sympathetic plaintiffs. This strategy is
understandable: offering plaintiffs who are anorgasmic married women using
147. See Sarah Knab Keitt, Catherine Wagner, Cynthia Tong, and Sherry A. Marts, Positioning
Women’s Health Curricula in US Medical Schools, MEDSCAPE GENERAL MEDICINE 5(2), 2003 (noting
lack of a women’s health curriculum in medical schools despite important differences in women’s
responses in conditions common to women and men, such as lung cancer and heart disease), available at
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/455372 (last visited Mar. 20, 2004) (access to this article may
be obtained through free registration at the Medscape website; on file with author).
148. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
149. See Cynthia Gorney, Designing Women: Scientists and Capitalists Dream of Finding a Drug
that Could Boost Female Sexuality. There’s One Little Problem . . . . , WASH. POST, Jun. 30, 2002, at
W08.
150. LEONORE TIEFER & ELLYN KASCHAK, A NEW VIEW OF WOMEN’S SEXUAL PROBLEMS
(2002).
151. See supra note 2 (listing statutes). Morality seems to be the sole justification, despite the fact
that the use of these devices could improve existing marriages. No health concerns are cited, such as use
of the devices will lead to blindness. Health concerns seem to cut in the opposite direction. The
devices, used alone, could prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.
There may be other health benefits as well. A recent study has shown that in males,
masturbation may help prevent cancer. See “Masturbating may protect against prostate cancer,” NEW
SCIENTIST, July 16, 2003 (available at http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99993942 (last
visited April 6, 2004)) (“The protective effect is greatest while men are in their twenties: those who had
ejaculated more than five times per week in their twenties for instance, were one-third less likely to
develop aggressive prostate cancer later in life. . . . The results contradict those of previous studies,
which have suggested that having had many sexual partners, or a high frequency of sexual activity,
increases the risk of prostate cancer by up to 40 percent. The key difference is that these earlier studies
defined sexual activity as sexual intercourse, whereas the latest study focused on the number of
ejaculations, whether or not intercourse was involved.”).
152. There is a vibrator-like device approved by the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940, 884.5960
(2004).
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the sex devices with their husbands,153 women who began using the devices
with their husbands but who now are single (no reason for the split revealed),154
or disabled women allows the court to acknowledge female sexual needs
without challenging the primacy of marriage and the male role.155 Courts seem
more willing to see a constitutional right of women to the private use of these
devices as long as they have a legally sanctioned relationship with a man or as
long as the use of the device is for medical or therapeutic purposes, suggesting
a quasi-prescription requirement.156 Thus to use a vibrator, women have to be
sick or married.157 Practicing sound litigation strategies, lawyers have chosen
plaintiffs who have the best chance of chipping away at the law, given cultural
bias, but that also maintain existing legal restrictions on women’s sexual
fulfillment in general.158
Arguing within the quasi-prescription rubric in the Kansas case State v.
Hughes, a psychologist and sex therapist testified on behalf of a defendant
(charged with selling various devices) that vibrators and dildos were used in the
treatment of anorgasmic and incontinent women. The justifications for use of
the prohibited sex toys included: (1) some women are physiologically less
responsive and use of the vibrator or dildo lowers the threshold for response;
(2) by producing intense stimulation and orgasm, these devices break down the
patient’s orgasmic inhibitions; and (3) the dildo or vibrator helps the patient
perform Kegel exercise to improve pelvic muscles.159
The strategy was successful. The Kansas court held that the “statute is
impermissibly overbroad when it impinges without justification on the sphere
of constitutionally protected privacy which encompasses therapy for medical
and psychological disorders.”160 Note that the exception that the Kansas
Supreme Court carved out of the statute defines a female pathology. In

153. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955 (11th Cir. 2001).
154. Id.
155. Some challenges are still possible based on “as applied” challenges to the law. See Red Bluff
Drive-In v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981).
156. The fact that the state accomplishes its goal through a ban on the sale of vibrators, rather than
random bed checks, does not make a difference. As the Supreme Court noted in Carey v. Population
Services, “such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in
matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, and Roe v. Wade.” Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977).
157. Even the Food and Drug Administration, in its regulation of vibrators, feels the need to limit
its definition to the euphemistic “therapeutic use.” 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940, 884.5960 (2004).
158. See generally David C. Minneman, Constitutionality of State Statutes Banning Distribution of
Sexual Devices, 94 A.L.R. 497 (2001) (advising, that “[t]estimony of an expert witness, such as a statecertified psychologist and sex therapist may be helpful. Such an expert might, for example, testify that a
dildo vibrator is effective and commonly prescribed in the treatment of both anorgasmic and incontinent
women . . . and that if such devices were to become not readily available to the general public,
anorgasmic women would be substantially impacted.”).
159. 792 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1990).
160. Id. at 1031-32 (“We hold the dissemination and promotion of such devices for purposes of
medical and psychological therapy to be a constitutionally protected activity.”).
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Louisiana and Colorado, similar laws were struck down as being overbroad
because they contained no exception for medical and therapeutic uses.161
With regard to sex aids, rather than conceptualizing these devices as
necessary to correct sexual dysfunction in women, it would be more accurate to
recognize that many women may not necessarily achieve orgasm through the
traditional sexual positions that allow a male to achieve orgasm.162 Because of
anatomical differences, the sexual position that is most likely to guarantee
procreation and male orgasm may be much less likely to achieve orgasm in
females because it does not stimulate the clitoris.163
Studies that are more recent indicate that forty-three percent of women
experience sexual problems.164 These numbers are consistent with earlier
studies of the “frigidity” rates of women.165 It is a wonder that the high
percentage alone does not alert us to the fact that it may not necessarily be the
woman who is sexually dysfunctional. A more logical conclusion to be drawn
from the data might be that it is the culture, one that fails to investigate the
issues and to educate its citizenry, that is dysfunctional. Rather than claiming
this high percentage of sexual problems is a treatable “medical condition,” it
could be recognized as a “social condition,” leading to much-needed research
and education of both women and men.166
If women are to achieve orgasm on a regular basis, as men do, apparently
some method in addition to, or other than, the traditional implantation of the
penis into the vagina often has to take place. The idealization of heterosexual
sex generally as requiring male erection and vaginal penetration likely arose

161. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000); People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697
P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985).
162. See MAINES, supra note 21, at 48-49; DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
SEXUALITY 87 (1979) (suggesting “that many women do not orgasm during intercourse, or do so
sporadically, simply because sexual intercourse is an extremely inefficient way to stimulate the
clitoris.”).
163. KINSEY, supra note 119, at 567-93; HITE, supra note 121, at 136 (survey data shows that only
30% of women achieve orgasm during intercourse); id. at 51 (reporting that penetration is rarely used by
women as a means of achieving orgasm); WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HUMAN
SEXUAL RESPONSE 133 (1966) (“Understandably, the maximum physiologic intensity of orgasmic
response subjectively reported or objectively recorded has been achieved by self regulated mechanical
or automanipulative techniques. The next highest level of erotic intensity has resulted from partner
manipulation, again with established or self-regulated methods, and the lowest intensity of target-organ
response was achieved during coition.”)
164. See Kevin L. Billups, The Role of Mechanical Devices in Treating Female Sexual
Dysfunction and Enhancing the Female Sexual Response, 20 WORLD J. UROLOGY 137-41 (2002);
Edward O. Laumann et al., Sexual Dysfunction in the United States: Prevalence and Predictors, 281 J.
AMER. MED. ASS’N 537, 540 (1999) (showing that sexual dysfunction is more prevalent among women
than men). Other studies estimate that 30-50% of women suffer sexual problems. Berman & Goldstein,
supra note 134, at 405. These dysfunctions include hypoactive sexual desire disorder, sexual aversion
disorder, orgasmic disorder, and sexual pain disorders. Id.
165. See MAINES, supra note 21, at 61 (noting studies showing rates of 66–75% and 60-90%).
166. Reasons to use a vibrator may also include: use by persons who are not in relationships, by
choice or life circumstances and use as a tool for learning to have an orgasm or increasing the intensity
of orgasm.
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because it is a good position for procreation and male orgasm.167 If not
satisfied by this model of heterosexual sex, women risked being labeled
frigid,168 or learned the adaptive behavior of “faking it,”169 a talent that Meg
Ryan demonstrated to the surprised Billy Crystal in a restaurant in the movie
When Harry Met Sally.170 Like Crystal’s character, most college men in a
study were almost certain that women never faked orgasm with them, while
almost all the college women acknowledged “faking it” some of the time.171
In summary, very little research has been done in the area of female
sexuality; as a result, almost half of women are labeled sexually dysfunctional
(if in fact the other half are even being honest about their sex lives).
Furthermore, several states have criminalized the sale of devices that aid female
orgasm. Lawyers have smartly noted that the most sympathetic challenges
involve those brought by “dysfunctional” females. Consequently, these cases
are brought to the attention of the courts. Thus, women currently must be
tagged with the medical and legal label of “dysfunctional” in order to gain
access to devices that help women achieve orgasm. These laws are unfair,
stigmatizing, misguided, and “uncommonly silly.”172 The question that
remains is whether these laws are unconstitutional after the Court’s decision in
Lawrence.
IV. THE ANATOMY OF THE TYPICAL CASE
To fully understand the sex aid cases and their constitutional implications,
it is important to picture the scene of the crime. For example, Texas (which
spawned the Lawrence case with its anti-sodomy law) has an anti-vibrator law
forbidding the sale of devices “designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs.”173 The following scenario is from an
actual Texas case, Webber v. State,174 chosen for the court’s clear explanation
of the criminal act and subsequent trial.175
167. This is consistent with other evidence that sexuality has not been linked to the pursuit of
mutual pleasure. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL, MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (1975).
168. See discussion supra note 118; MAINES, supra note 21, at 55, 61, and 117 (quoting FRANK
CAPRIO, THE ADEQUATE MALE 70 (1952)).
169. Celia Roberts et al., Faking It: The Story of ‘Ohh! WOMEN’S STUD. INT. FORUM. 18, nos. 5-6
(1995).
170. WHEN HARRY MET SALLY (Castle Rock Entertainment 1989).
171. Id.
172. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (Stewart J., dissenting)).
173. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7).
174. 21 S.W.3d 726, 728-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
175. The statute in issue in this particular case required the device to be used “primarily” for genital
stimulation. One statute, however, does not contain this qualifier, only that the devices may be used for
the purpose of genital stimulation. See VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-373 (1996 & Supp. 2003). This
definition is so broad that zucchinis and cucumbers might fit the statutory language, thus making the
vegetable section of the supermarket a likely place for the next stakeout. As one court noted, this
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In 2000, two police officers were working an undercover operation in
Travis County, Texas. Deputy Sheriff Carlin was a female officer, and the
other officer, who is narrating below, posed as her husband:
[We] entered the Adult Video Store, a licensed sexually oriented
business. [The suspect] came forward and offered to help Carlin.
Carlin told [the suspect] that she was experiencing marital problems
and that she was looking for a vibrator – something for sexual
gratification. [The suspect] showed Carlin her four best selling
devices.
[The suspect] placed batteries in these devices and
demonstrated their varying range of speed and flexibility. Carlin
selected one of the devices for which she paid [the suspect] thirty-six
dollars and ninety-five cents.176
The Texas Appeals Court offered the following description of the ensuing
trial:
During trial, the device Carlin purchased was referred to as a “dildo.”
Carlin testified that there was no “mistaking the shape of this dildo for
anything other than a male penis,” and that it was capable of
stimulating the female sexual organ. She also testified that she did not
believe the dildo she purchased could be used for anything other than
sexual gratification. Under cross-examination, Carlin conceded that
the dildo could be used as a doorstop or a paperweight, but testified
that she would not use it for those purposes, and that it was not
marketed for use as a doorstop or paperweight.177
The essence of the testimony was that if it looked like a dildo and could be used
as a dildo, it was one.178 Despite the flimsy yet clever, “paperweight defense,”
the defendant was convicted.
Based upon this analysis, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the initial
sentence of thirty days in jail and a fine of $4,000.179 The only consolation
offered to the defendant in Webber was the concurring opinion of the female
justice, noting the law’s waste of resources and quoting another justice: “Here

ambitious legislative quest to stamp out devices to stimulate sexual responsiveness could also include
viagra and penile implants, although it does not appear that prosecutorial resources have shifted to this
area.
176. Webber, 21 S.W.3d at 729.
177. Id.
178. The Texas Court of Appeals judge refused to be confused by the argument that the statute did
not define the word “dildo,” instead pronouncing quite authoritatively that a “dildo is an obscene device
as a matter of law.” Id. Judge Dally cited a dictionary and apparently took judicial notice that “by
common usage, a dildo is defined as ‘an object serving as a penis substitute for vaginal insertion.’” Id.
(citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 633 (Phillip B. Gove ed., 1961)).
179. Id. at 732.
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we go raising the price of dildos again.”180 The thirty-day sentence imposed by
the Texas legal system, however, would be considered light by Louisiana
standards where, in the case of State v. Brenan, the jury sentenced a seller to
four years of “hard labor” for a similar crime.181 The Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on appeal, finding the vibrators were not obscene.
Several judges in the intermediate appellate court in Louisiana, although
agreeing with the reversal, found it necessary to note that allowing the use of
sex aids did not connote approval: “We personally find the items seized to be
Questions of legality
shameful, reprehensible and disgusting.”182
notwithstanding, these members of the judiciary shared the legislature’s moral
disapproval of sex aids.
The Webber case imposes both a criminal and social stigma on sex aids.
Moreover, these types of prosecutions each involve a state using its limited
resources to chill behavior generally. Often the government prosecutes these
cases under obscenity statutes that attach a tag of “morbid” and “shameful”
activity to the use of these devices in private sexual conduct.183 Although the
sales sometimes take place in a public place (like the Webber case) or in a
private home (such as the Passion Party thrown by Joanne Webb184 or the sale
of contraceptives in Griswold), the issue is the use of the prohibited items by
consenting adults in private. Before Lawrence, and under Glucksberg, the
Supreme Court would have begun the constitutional analysis by asking whether
there was a tradition and history of protecting the sale of sex aids used for
personal gratification.185 After Lawrence, the discussion should focus on
whether the government has any reason, other than moral disapproval, for
policing consenting adults in their private bedroom activities.

180. Webber, 21 S.W.3d at 732 (Smith J., concurring) (quoting Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7,
11 (Tex.App. 1994) (Brown, J., concurring.)).
181. 772 So.2d 64, 66 (La. 2000) (affirming reversal of conviction of defendant for promotion of
obscene devices; defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor on each of two counts and a $3000
fine was imposed, but the trial court suspended the sentence and placed her on probation for five years
before the conviction was reversed on appeal).
182. State v. Brenan, 739 So.2d 368, 373 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1999), aff’d, 772 So.2d 64 (La. 2000).
183. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973) (discussing that, according to the Cal.
Penal Code §311.2(a), obscenity requires “appeal to the prurient interest,” and “patently offensive . . .
sexual conduct” and “prurient” was defined as “shameful or morbid”). See also, Mireya Navarro
Instead of Dr. Ruth, A Nurse Called Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004 (Sex adviser notes that “[s]hame
fear, guilt and ignorance all get in the way of good sex, Ms. Johanson said, adding that based on the calls
she receives, many Americans lack basic knowledge.”)
184. See supra notes 4-9.
185. See supra Part I.
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V. LOOKING FORWARD: CAN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN SEXUAL
SATISFACTION BE RECOGNIZED AND PROTECTED UNDER LAWRENCE?
Constitutional case doctrine is creeping toward a broader understanding of
adult life choices. Disengaging sex from marriage, Eisenstadt v. Baird
prohibited the state from intruding on contraceptive decisions of persons who
were not married.186 The Lawrence decision disengaged sex from reproduction
by protecting sexual relationships where procreation was not possible. Now, as
gender, sex, and social roles are breaking free from the previous binary
paradigm of male and female,187 more emphasis on a “right to sex” may emerge
in the law, a right that focuses on the pleasure of the act rather than a
procreative purpose. Lawrence gives power to the value of sexual intimacy
alone, unrelated to procreative issues such as contraceptives or abortion.
A. Lawrence and the Language of Liberty
The Lawrence opinion reflects a carefully constructed political
compromise. As quickly as Glucksberg seemed to reduce constitutional
guarantees of liberty to whatever could be protected in the legislative arena,
Lawrence seems to bring back memories of Griswold. As far as liberty is
concerned, Lawrence reiterates: “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions.”188 It is an elegant discourse on individual autonomy
and liberty.
Nevertheless, broad statements of individual rights are mixed with some
clear limitations. The opinion has language that gives and then takes,
sometimes in the same sentence. Thus, the Court’s opinion announces that a
“personal relationship . . . whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals.”189 The Court is willing to declare a moderate expansion of our
present concept of liberty, but quickly notes that our protection from state
intervention is that we cannot be criminally convicted for it.190 The Court
reasoned that making the conduct criminal was an invitation to discrimination

186. See Carey v. Population Services, Inc., 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (“Griswold may no longer be
read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple’s use of contraceptives. Read in
light of its progeny [Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade], the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution
protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”)
187. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 23941 (1999).
188. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
189. Id. at 2478.
190. Id..
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and had a stigmatizing effect that infringed on “the dignity of the persons
charged.”191 Lawrence is also clear that the case did “not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”192 Thus, same-sex marriage and military service were
explicitly excluded from the ruling. There are other limits on the ethereal
language too. The opinion’s protection for intimacy applies only to consenting
adults193 in private spaces.194 The signal that the Court is giving is that the
liberty interest may seem broad in reach, yet easily can be trimmed back in
application.195
From a pragmatic perspective, Lawrence was not written to praise liberty,
but to bury Bowers. 196 Justice Kennedy highlighted the error made by the
Bowers Court; he did not hold back condemnation of the reasoning or the
ruling.197 Because the point was to rid the Court of Bowers, defining the
positive doctrinal parameters of liberty and privacy interests became less
critical than negating the limits imposed by Bowers. Thus, although it is clear
that Bowers is dead, it is unclear what doctrine lives on.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence declined to mention the
Glucksberg test.198 Steering the Court away from previous substantive due
process cases, Kennedy incorporated tradition and history into his analysis, 199
but with the twist that he examined it on a more specific and recent level.200
Rather than attack the standard directly as one easily manipulated, Kennedy
simply manipulates the standard, deftly showing by example the dangerous
plasticity of the tradition and history doctrine. For example, Kennedy noted
that the number of states prohibiting sodomy was decreasing, and, even among
those that did prohibit it, there was a “pattern of nonenforcement with respect
191. Id. at 2482.
192. Id. at 2484.
193. Id. (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.”)
194. Id. (“It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”)
195. See generally Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 104-05 (2003) (“[T]he Court has not committed itself to the full
consequences of its position. It has crafted its opinion so as to allow itself flexibly to respond to the
unfolding nature of public discussion.”).
196. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (“Bowerswas not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.”).
197. Bowers had been widely criticized and Justice Kennedy cited some of that criticism, most
notably conservative critics. Id. at 2489 (citing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE
REAGAN REVOLUTION – A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991); RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON
341-50 (1992)).
198. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472.
199. Id. at 2480 (although acknowledging that “for centuries there have been powerful voices to
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral” the opinion stated that
200. Id. at 2479 (“[T]here is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter [but] instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more
generally.”). Kennedy also noted that between 1880 and 1995, prosecutions for same sex sodomy
involved conduct in a public place. Id.
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to consenting adults acting in private.”201 Although using his version of the
“history and tradition” standard to justify his analysis, Kennedy also more
directly noted that historical and traditional condemnation of an activity by the
majority should not automatically trump a liberty interest.202 He undercut the
point, however, by allowing recent history and tradition – or recent majoritarian
decision-making or an “emerging recognition” – to define the liberty interest.203
Although the opinion essentially ignored Glucksberg in both name and
spirit, the Supreme Court’s cryptic prose in Lawrence makes it difficult to
determine what the substantive due process doctrine actually protects, and
where and when it protects us from government morality monitors.204 It is
cheerfully free of comprehensible doctrine that could be applied in future cases,
but instead favors a discussion at a high level of generality.205 There is no
fundamental right explicitly declared, although the Court does rely on other
cases where fundamental rights were established or recognized.206 Although
heightened scrutiny would correlate with the Texas law’s demise, heightened
scrutiny was not explicitly applied. The Court found morality could not be a
“legitimate” justification for the law,207 which would seem to signal the
application of rational relationship review.208 But this standard was never

201. Id. at 2481.
202. Id. at 2480.
203. Id. (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance
here.”).
204. Justice Kennedy notes, for example, that, “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of
the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475
(2003). Later, Justice Kennedy cautions:
This, as a rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning
of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.
Id. at 2478.
205. For example, the Lawrence opinion opens with the following general statement:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief expression, and certain intimate conduct. The
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.
Id. at 2475.
206. The Court did use the word “fundamental” in its opinion. Id. at 2477 (noting that Roe
“confirmed once more” that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause “has a substantive
dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person”). The Court also described
the privacy right identified in Eisenstadt as a fundamental human right. Id.
207. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (stating that the “Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”)
208. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992)(rational basis review requires a
“legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means”).
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enunciated either, and would be unlikely to lead to a negative result for any
statute’s constitutionality. Rational relationship review has meant a quick look
and a green light.209 It presumes the validity of the law, and does not require a
contemporaneous legislative record of support, or even a particularly close
means-end fit.210 Rather, the challenger must negate possible bases of
support.211 Given that the Lawrence opinion seems to subject Texas to proving
the legitimacy of the law, the Court is not adhering to standard rational
relationship review. Thus, the Supreme Court remains free to decide whether
protected liberty interests exist on a case-by-case basis, by applying the
standard rational relationship review in cases where it does not want to extend
the liberty interest, or applying the more amorphous Lawrence standard where
it does want to extend the interest.212
B. Sex Aids and Liberty: The Doctrinal Parameters of Lawrence
Does Lawrence mean that sex aids are protected from government
“morals” regulation? Certainly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that sexual
conduct in the bedroom between consenting adults fits within the general
parameters of protected conduct.213 Lawrence took privacy past the point
where the right arguably could be limited to procreation. The language of
Lawrence echoes the joint opinion in Casey by protecting decisional autonomy:
“The Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s
most basic decisions about family and parenthood.”214
209. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (legislative
classification must be upheld under rational basis review “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification” and that “where there are ‘plausible
reasons’ for Congress’ action, ‘our inquiry is at an end’”); Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.4 (6th ed. 2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court most often describes the basic
standard of review to be used in substantive due process and equal protection cases as one under which
the courts will uphold a law so long as there is a ‘rational relationship’ between the law and any
‘legitimate interest’ of the government. This form of review gives great deference to the legislature.”).
210. Id. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“But the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.”).
211. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) (upholding classifications that distinguished
the mentally retarded from mentally ill persons, applying lower standards for civil commitment to the
former category).
212. The beauty of this approach for the Court is that it allows the Supreme Court to return to
letting the government win in other cases, without the messiness of defining a fundamental right or
having to apply any particular test. This type of approach is similar to the Court’s discarded approach in
the obscenity cases known as the “I know it when I see it” system. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
213. See Lawrence, supra at 2484 (“[This] case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to the homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”) See also POSNER & SILBAUGH,
supra note 10, at 1 (Sex is the “quintessential private activity [of] our culture.”).
214. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
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Indeed, some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s privacy
decisions – Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe – are based more accurately on a
“right to sex” theory.215 The argument is that more than decisional and bodily
autonomy are at stake in the decisions because one could avoid the pregnancy
and the child by not engaging in traditional peno-vaginal sex. 216 In other
words, because abstinence or other forms of sexual gratification were not
discussed as plausible alternatives, it can be inferred that the Supreme Court
silently recognized an underlying right to adult consensual sexual activities.217
Lawrence contributes to this argument because it explicitly recognizes the
value of a sexual relationship, or sex as a component of self-identity, where
there is no chance for procreation.218 With no concern about a forced invasion
of bodily autonomy (Roe) or the decisional autonomy involved in using
contraception to prevent parenting (Griswold and Eisenstadt), Lawrence seems
to rest on a right to “the personal and private life of the individual” in matters
of sex.219
The question remains, however, whether the private use of sex aids would
fall within the sphere of protected conduct that the Lawrence opinion describes.
By its language, the opinion’s protection seems to be limited to (1) consensual
acts, (2) involving adult humans, (3) in private, who are engaged in (4) safe, (5)
sodomy that (6) does not bear the affirmative sanction of the government.220
215. See David Cruz, The “Sexual Freedom Cases?” Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the
Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 325, 328 (2000) (“[T]he ‘right to sex’ interpretation is
expressly grounded on what are taken to be the logical implications of these decisions; the interpretation
does not stem merely from statements of the Court, which, in light of the abstinence gap in the expressed
rationales, are inadequate to justify the cases’ outcomes . . . . In sum, the ‘right to sex’ interpretation of
the sexual freedom cases, in relying on the abstinence gap argument, treats the Supreme Court’s sexual
freedom decisions as establishing a right to engage in sexual activities for reasons other than
procreation”). See also Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s
Freedom’s Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1325 (1997) (“What Griswold and Eisenstadt protected for
both married and unmarried individuals was the freedom to engage in heterosexual intercourse without
fear of familial and reproductive consequences.”).
216. Cruz, supra note 216, at 315-29.
217. An irony for women is that peno-vaginal intercourse subjects women to the risk of pregnancy
with less likelihood of experiencing orgasm. Roe is considered a victory for women because it spares
women from childbearing because of sex. Yet, the sexual position that resulted in the pregnancy might
not have been the most enjoyable for them sexually. Catharine MacKinnon made a similar point more
starkly when she stated that “women can have abortions so men can have sex.” See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, supra note 128, at 1300.
218. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. In contrast, many prior opinions seemed to focus on
procreation as the right protected. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140-41 (1973) (holding that right to
privacy included woman’s right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (indicating that
marital privacy includes the right to use contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(stating procreation is “one of the basic civil rights of man,” as it is “fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race”).
219. Id.
220. Justice Kennedy noted:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
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The use of vibrators and other sex aids meets most of these criteria. For
example, with regard to vibrators and other sex aids, assume that there is (1) at
least one consenting (2) adult (3) acting in private. The use of sex aids is also
(4) safe, 221 and (6) no affirmative government sanction is sought—all that is
requested is noninterference with a private relationship between person and
device. With regard to the specific limitations considered in Lawrence, then,
the use of sex aids is different only in the nature of the private sexual act.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence noted the stigma
attached to the criminal conviction in Lawrence and that same stigma is present
here. A conviction for selling a vibrator carries a serious criminal penalty, 222
often more serious than the penalty for sodomy in Lawrence.223 Convictions
for distributing an obscene object subject a defendant to the possibility of a jail
term and fines, as well as the collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction.224
Finally, sex aids implicate the other more general concerns reflected in
Lawrence - both spatial autonomy and “an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”225 First,
the state laws reflect disapproval of private sexual expression in one’s home.
Second, as to freedom in intimate matters, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Lawrence stated, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring.”226 Although he tends to focus on relationship bonds in this
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
221. If necessary, sex aids could contain warning labels like virtually every other consumer product
sold in the United States.
222. See, e.g., State v. Brenan, 772 So.2d 64, 66 (La. 2000) (affirming reversal of conviction of
defendant for promotion of obscene devices; defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor on each
of two counts and a $3000 fine was imposed, but the trial court suspended the sentence and placed her
on probation for five years before the conviction was reversed on appeal); Webber v. State, 21 S.W.3d
726, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (defendant sentenced to county jail for 30 days and fined $4000 for
promoting an obscene device); Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (conviction
affirmed of defendant found guilty of possessing obscene devices – seventeen dildos called “FlexiLovers” – and sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $250); see generally discussion at notes 174-83,
supra.
223. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482 (“The offense, to be sure, is a class C misdemeanor, a minor
offense in the Texas legal system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity
of the persons charged.”).
224. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482 (noting, for example, that convictions would have to be listed on
job applications).
225. Id.
226. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. Cf. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and
Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1123 (1998) (arguing that the constitutional right to
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context,227 partners in a relationship may use a vibrator to strengthen bonds; it
can be an “addition to” rather than a “replacement” for a partner. 228 Even
when used solo, it may improve sexual relationships by heightening one’s own
sexual awareness.
Moreover, although sex acts like sodomy occur within the context of two
people, no longstanding relationship need exist. Rather, sodomy could occur in
the realm of the “one night stand” category. Although Lawrence explicitly
involved a two-person relationship, it presumably extends to casual interactions
between individuals where “intimacy” is measured not in emotional but in
physical terms. Similarly, persons, who neither desire to nor have a long-term
partner do not have necessarily less of a sexual drive or right to sexual
satisfaction. As such, there really should be no need to find a partner at all to
qualify for some sexual privacy. Any right to engage in an intimate sexual
relationship should necessarily imply the right not to engage in such a
relationship with another person but instead to proceed independently.229
One’s relationship with oneself certainly deserves some consideration. It is
our right to our own thoughts, relationship choices, and sexual expression that
Lawrence protects from governmental intrusion.230 In the context of this case,
that unconstitutional intrusion comes when the state seeks to label vibrators
obscene and criminalize them because they may be used for autonomous sexual
expression.231
C. The Subtle Shift of the Burden of Proof
Justice Kennedy may have subtly switched the burden of proof from the
challenger to the government in Lawrence, saying that Texas had tried to
“control a personal relationship that. . . is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished.”232 Thus, this invasion of “liberty” needed to
be justified by the state, with the presumption being that the space was
protected from state intrusion.
Justice Kennedy accomplished this burden shift by stating that Texas had
no “legitimate state interest” to justify the intrusion.233 This language is
privacy protects relationships, not individuals, and that once “individuals involved in reproduction are at
odds, then the right of relational privacy fails to insulate them, either from the state or from the claims of
one another”).
227. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
228. Id. at 2478. The court stated, “ It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain
their dignity as free persons.” Id.
229. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (the freedom to associate
includes the freedom not to associate)
230. Id. at 2475.
231. See supra notes 11-13 .
232. Id. at 2478.
233. Id. at 2484.
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confusing, however, as “legitimate” often indicates a rational relationship
standard of review, not one of strict scrutiny,234 and states rarely have problems
defending their laws under this more lenient standard where the law’s
challenger bears the burden of proof.235 The Supreme Court, however, has
occasionally struck down a law under this test, concluding, for example, that
the “bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group” was not a
legitimate interest when it involved hippies,236 the mentally retarded237 or
homosexuals.238 Those cases are aberrational, and are often forgotten or
distinguished, leaving the typical high level of deference to the states as the
remembered and invoked norm.
If the Court were to shift the burden in these types of sexual privacy cases
more explicitly, that small step would at least require states interested in
protecting their morality law to provide a contemporaneous legislative record
of justification. Though the justification need not be a compelling one, a
legislature would have to consider its actions more carefully and would have to
be prepared to explain them. This approach might discourage some legislation,
and, at a minimum, force lawmakers to articulate the benefits and rationales of
a given law.
In the case of sex aids, for example, rather than a blanket moral
condemnation, arguments about their use would be brought to the legislature as
a preliminary matter, and, if necessary, to the courts—but with a
contemporaneous legislative record. Thus, the subtle burden shifting would
force more explicit legislative justification and a concrete rationalization
beyond “morality.” The interest would have to be one that articulates more
than an unembellished desire to dictate private adult sexual expression in
consensual situations.239 For example, when the Alabama legislature posits that

234. See Anthony B. Sanders, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations
Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 67374 (2004).
235. See, e.g., Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955). See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493,
500 n.26 (1997).
236. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down
regulation, on equal protection grounds, based on impermissible animosity towards hippies and their
communes).
237. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding state’s zoning
provision with regard to the mentally retarded failed equal protection rational relationship review). But
see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (finding state’s thinly justified distinction between the mentally
ill and the mentally retarded was justified using the ordinary version of rational basis review).
238. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado amendment
preventing gays and lesbians from receiving protection within laws prohibiting discrimination based on
an “irrational prejudice” under equal protection analysis, while noting the “unprecedented” breadth of
the constitutional amendment as supporting its conclusion).
239. Indeed, the limits set out in Lawrence still allow the state to regulate sex involving minors,
public sex, and bestiality. Prostitution may also be regulated for public health reasons as well as
concerns about consent. Most laws against fornication have disappeared, although a few states still have
them. POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 10, at 99-102 (both Arizona and New Mexico have repealed
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vibrators are obscene,240 suggesting they have no legitimate use, this
characterization would have to be explained in light of the emerging medical
literature and would be subject to some dispute. Unless the legislature is
prepared to declare that achieving sexual satisfaction in 40% of the adult
female population is an obscenity, or even that vibrators do not promote
marriage, they will have difficulty justifying their reasoning. Ultimately, when
forced to articulate their reasoning, at a minimum, they create a record of their
reasoning for the courts and their constituents.
If used only in the cases where privacy and liberty interests are at issue,
burden shifting could afford some constitutional protection, while maintaining
the more common form of rational relationship review in other cases.241
Although not a perfect solution, or one immune from mishandling or confusion,
reading Lawrence in this manner recognizes a broader range of privacy
interests and provides the potential for a greater degree of constitutional
protection because it requires the legislature to give value to those interests in
its initial legislative consideration, unlike ordinary rational relationship review
where the legislature is not required to maintain a contemporaneous legislative
record of reasoning.
D. The Politics Underlying Lawrence
Lawrence seems deliberately ambiguous in its reach. Much of the decision
attacks the specifics of the Bowers holding rather than justifying any new
approach, perhaps making Lawrence a sui generis case in which a majority of
the Justices, aware of the growing gay rights movement in the United States,
became increasingly uncomfortable with the rhetoric and result of Bowers.242

their statutes since the time of publication). Georgia’s fornication law was struck down as a violation of
the right to privacy. In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003).
Generally, with regard to bigamy, polygamy, and adultery, the right to the formal state
sanctioned relationship of marriage may be enough to allow the state the legitimate interest in banning
these acts based on financial and health protection of spouses and children. The distinction between
sodomy and these acts is harm to third parties. See generally Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and
Same-Sex-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and Fundamental Interests, 8 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 313
(1998) (arguing that adultery bans are constitutional because they promote marriage and family); Maura
Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same Sex Marriage, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 1501, 1622 (1997) (concluding that “[u]nlike polygamy, same-sex marriage poses no threat to
American ideals of separation of church and state, individual autonomy, equality of all men, and
equality of men and women.”).
240. The articulated interests of the states are generally to prevent obscenity, and to promote
marriage and the family. See cases cited supra note 13.
241. See Higgins, supra note 137, at 1702 (suggesting review of gender based classifications that
“would require actual consideration of the political process rather than speculation about the
disadvantage of groups within that process”).
242. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-84 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Given the national conversation that followed Bowers, it would have been much more unlikely that a
Justice on the Court would not have considered the subject in a more realistic way than in 1986. Justice
Powell, in a now infamous story, told a clerk at the time of the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick that he
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The Court has been educated; state legislatures have signaled a national shift in
perspective on the issue.243 Thus, the Court overturned Bowers in minimalist
fashion, upholding and simultaneously restricting a basic right. This approach
recognized and reflected a modest shift in popular opinion on the issue, and left
it open to further dialogue.244 It is a pragmatic recognition that the love that
dare not speak its name has become part of our modern cultural discourse. In
Lawrence, the Court attempted to capture the emerging cultural accord on the
issue of criminalizing sodomy, while being careful not to endorse same sex
marriage or gays in the military, two issues upon which a national consensus
has not been reached.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Lawrence reached the correct conclusion in granting
constitutional protectio
n to adult sexual privacy where consensual, non -public,
and no harm to third parties is involved. At least temporarily, it disregarded the
restrictive Glucksberg test. As much as Lawrence includes limiting language,
the opinion also indicates a desire to expand the personal, private space of
individuals under the Constitution. The prime evidence is its expansive reading
of liberty, one that largely ignores the restrictive Glucksberg definition of
fundamental rights. For all the criticism that could be leveled at Justice
Kennedy for failing to write a clear, crisp, clean opinion that could serve as a
guide in future cases, the obtuse language probably best reflects a workable
compromise. The disappearance of the Glucksberg test, even if temporary, is
reason enough to commend the result. In its place, liberty and privacy, in the
abstract, are elevated to a more hallowed status, potentially foreshadowing a
more expansive protection of these interests in future cases.
When considering sex aid cases after Lawrence, the courts should not view
the situation from a male-centered definition of sexuality that reduces women’s
normal needs to pathologies or diseases or that ignores sexuality unrelated to
procreation. Rather, courts should examine whether it is constitutionally
permissible for a state to outlaw the sale of sexual devices that are used in the
privacy of an adult’s own bedroom. They should rationally conclude that the
government has no such power. In the private realm of consensual adult sex
had never met a homosexual. The clerk, who was gay, did not correct him. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR.,
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 530 (1994).
243. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481 (noting only four states still enforced sodomy laws against
homosexual conduct, and that 12 states had repealed their prohibitions since the Bowersdecision); See
generally Post, supra note 195, at 8, 89-109 (arguing that “constitutional law and culture are locked in a
dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture”).
244. See Post, supra note 244, at 105 (noting that if Lawrence’s “ambiguity accurately capture[s]
the essential ambivalence of American constitutional culture on the question of sexual orientation” the
Court may not need to clarify it, but otherwise will have to resolve the tension if pressed to extend or
limit the decision”).
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visceral distaste of a practice should not, absent a clear showing of harm,
command judicial deference.
The banning of sex aids demonstrates the flaw in slavishly following
history and tradition as a guide to a practice’s legitimacy. A lack of concern
about women’s health issues has fueled a history and tradition that is oblivious
to the realities of women’s sexual selves. According undue weight to the
history and tradition prong of constitutional analysis turns past neglect into the
prologue for future oppression.
Griswold and Eisenstadt recognized that liberty requires a private space
where the government cannot intrude. At that time, the private sphere was
defined as intimate heterosexual relationships. As the Court has opened its
eyes to the reality of other types of consensual adult relationships, however, the
privacy principle has been equally applicable. By requiring legislatures to
prove the legitimacy of their rationale before they pass legislation that infringes
upon sexual privacy rights, the Supreme Court essentially imposed a higher
bar, requiring at least some legislative knowledge and fact-finding before such
restrictive legislative action is taken. Although theoretically the electorate
could exercise control over legislators contemplating restrictions on sexual
freedom and privacy, voter ignorance makes this political solution an
ineffective safeguard in this context.245
Ultimately, however, the key to changing the current legal treatment of sex
aids and their use does not lie solely within the court system. Real social
change will come about through the same route that led to the more enlightened
approach found in Lawrence—political action and education.246 Political
action at the state level—in the form of the repeal of state criminal sodomy
laws—allowed the Supreme Court in Lawrence to point to the profound
negative attitude of the nation to enforcing such laws.247 Similar political
activity and expressive activity can prompt activism and change in both
legislative and popular opinion.248
Evidence of change is beginning show up in our cultural laboratories.
Joanne Webb attempted to spread information about female sexuality through a
245. See JOHN FEREJOHN, Information and the Electoral Process, in INFORMATION AND
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3 (John Ferejohn & James Kuklinski, eds. 1990). See generally Michael X.
Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS
(1996); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Idea, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 416-19 (1998)
(discussing problems of widespread voter ignorance).
246. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 338 (1991) (arguing that courts “[at] best . . . can second the social reform acts of other
branches of government.”)
247. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
248. Commercial activity also fuels the spread of information. Sales representatives across the
nation are logging up millions of dollars in sales for Passion Parties, Pure Romance, and Toys in
Babeland. See Pamela Sitt, The Party That Could Get You Arrested in Texas: In-home Sex Toy Sales
Make for Naughty but Increasingly Mainstream Fun, SEATTLE TIMES, February 2, 2004 at E1; see also
Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1294 (noting widespread advertisement and use of both vibrators
and the erectile dysfunction medication Viagra).
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“Passion Party.”249 Her prosecution for distributing sex aids may prove to be
an even greater contribution to sex education because it provides an
opportunity for greater public awareness of the issue and may galvanize
opposition to such laws. The “Vagina Monologues” is playing at local theaters.
Cable television is showing the repeat of the popular “Sex and the City” series
where vibrators are openly discussed as a normal part of the characters’ sex
lives. Although these changes will not likely result in the immediate “massive
disruption of the social order”250 envisioned by Justice Scalia, they give us
reason to hope. Given the ignorance and discrimination that has characterized
sex and gender issues, reappraisals of our cultural, scientific, legislative, and
judicial attitudes toward sexuality are long-awaited and welcome.

249. See supra notes 4 and 5.
250. See supra note 1.

